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ABSTRACT 
Developing a future sustainable refuelling station network is the next important step to establish 
hydrogen as a fuel for vehicles and related services. Such stations will most likely be integrated in 
existing refuelling stations and result in multi-fuel storages with a variety of fuels being delivered, 
stored and distributed, as e.g. biomass based methane, ethanol, gasoline, diesel as well as the 
traditional crude oil based products. Hydrogen is also in play as intermediate energy storage to secure 
the power supply based on large shares of fluctuating energy sources and as an intermediate to 
improve the quality of biomass based fuels. Therefore, hydrogen supply and distribution chains will 
likely not only serve to fulfil the demands of refuelling, but may also be important for the wider 
electrical power and fuel industries. Based on an integrated hydrogen supply and distribution network, 
the application of the method of “Functional modelling” is discussed in this paper to show the 
complexity of the coupling between power storage for electricity supply and supplying hydrogen for 
transportation. It will be shown how a “Functional model” can be applied for comprehensive data 
storage for various assessment methodologies, and how functional models could support coherent risk 
and sustainability (Risk Assessment, Life Cycle Assessment /Life Cycle Costing) assessments, in 
order to find optimal solutions for the development of the infrastructure on a regional or national level. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Developing a future hydrogen refuelling station (HRS) network is the next important step to establish 
hydrogen as a fuel for vehicles and related services. Such stations will most likely be integrated in 
existing refuelling stations and result in multi-fuel storages with a variety of fuels being delivered, 
stored and distributed, as e.g. biomass based methane, ethanol, gasoline, diesel as well as the 
traditional crude oil based products. Hydrogen is also in play as intermediate energy storage to secure 
the power supply based on large shares of fluctuating energy sources and as an intermediate to 
improve the quality of biomass based fuels. Therefore, hydrogen supply and distribution chains will 
likely not only serve to fulfil the demands of refuelling, but may also be important for the wider 
electrical and fuel industries. 
This complicates the operation and control of these multifunctional hydrogen supply and distribution 
networks. This complexity also puts higher demands on the decision-making process addressing the 
sustainability and safety of these systems. The challenge for risk analysts is to treat many threads in a 
dynamical system. The reason is that most tools to ensure safety are designed to deal with individual 
plants and their components, e.g. fault tree analysis FTA & event tree analysis ETA. The needed fault 
trees and event trees quickly grow complex, because of the many scenarios to be analysed for their 
consequences. Therefore, it is demanding to provide risk informed decision support analysis even for 
rather simple cases as a HRS. From a systemic perspective, though, it is essential to take a holistic 
approach, as system safety is more than just the reliability of its single components. 
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 A challenge for making strategic decisions on the optimal methods and processes is to deal with and to 
compare infrastructures taking into account networks of refuelling stations including their supply 
chains.  
The problem is to find methods and solutions based on a risk informed approach that are able to 
provide useful criteria to support the strategic choices. How could a solution be structured to better 
cope with the above mentioned challenges and the uncertainties involved? How can one ensure that 
the various studies that feed into strategic decisions, such as risk assessment, environmental 
assessment and economic assessment actually deal with exactly the same system? How to compare 
and decide on different product types in a consistent way? These issues are very complex and, 
therefore, these are not to be solved in one paper, as they need a broad discussion and further 
development of tools. Thus, the intention of this paper is to raise awareness about such problems and 
to start a discussion on possible solutions.  
Based on an integrated hydrogen supply and distribution network, the application of the method of 
“Functional modelling” is discussed to show the complexity of the coupling of functions in a complex 
hydrogen supply and distribution network, where interferences and strong connections can be found 
between power storage for electricity supply and supplying hydrogen for transportation. It will be 
shown how a “Functional model” can be applied for comprehensive data storage for various 
assessment methodologies, and how functional models could support coherent risk and sustainability 
(Risk Analysis, Life Cycle Assessment /Life Cycle Costing) assessments, in order to find optimal 
solutions for the development of the infrastructure on a regional or national level. 
2.0 THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
Hydrogen is not an energy source in itself and has to be produced from e.g. natural gas or electrical 
power using steam reforming and water electrolysis, respectively, as indicated in Figure 1. The supply 
chain needs to have storages to store hydrogen for later use, such as small and large scale pressurized 
storage and / or cryogenic storages. Hydrogen is to be transported using pipelines, trucks or ships 
between the storage facilities and to the hydrogen refueling stations (HRS) or to industrial / domestic 
applications.  
 
Figure 1. Hydrogen supply and distribution chain  
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3.0 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Functional analysis 
The assessment of infrastructures requires high level hazard identification methods to be practical and 
effective. Therefore, the method of “Functional modelling” as described by Rasmussen & Whetton [1] 
is chosen and briefly described here. The methodology is based on the view that an infrastructure is to 
be seen as a socio-technical system. In order to identify hazards as early as possible during planning 
and design of the future hydrogen infrastructure a high level identification of hazards is a valuable first 
step. Methods like FMEA and HazOp are less suited for such concept hazard identification, because 
they are designed to deal with detailed designs of components and hazards closely related to the 
technical hardware. Also as pointed out by Rasmussen & Whetton these methods only to a lesser 
degree account for hazards related to interaction between the different equipment, operator 
interactions, software, organisational structure and management factors already on a plant level. These 
interactions are becoming even more pronounced for an infrastructure like a fully integrated hydrogen 
supply and distribution network. 
 
Figure 2. Generic functional breakdown 
In Figure 2, the generic framework to apply the functional modelling is shown. The idea is that a set of 
functions are needed to establish e.g. the hydrogen supply chain made of hardware, software, 
operations, work organisation and other aspects related to the infrastructure. Each function Fx is seen 
as an object that fulfils an “Intent” or goal. The “Intent” is associated with “Methods” and 
“Constraints” that allow to realize or limiting, respectively, the “Intent” itself. The Methods and 
Constraints themselves can be seen as objects which can be further decomposed into a hierarchy of 
other lower level Intents.  
The starting point F0 in our context is the whole hydrogen supply chain. The first breakdown to level 
F1..n will be the Intents that make the supply chain work and deliver safely. The next levels F11..nn 
further decomposes the Intents from the above level into increasingly more detailed elements. The 
functional breakdown continues until the system’s hazardous areas may be identified with reasonable 
precision using (high level) hazard identification methods, as described below. Thus, comprehensive 
hazard identification at design stage is possible using the principles of functional modelling. The 
processes, inputs, outputs and methods are described, usually graphically, and this graphical model is 
used to analyse the consequences of deviations in each of the elements in the model. The functional 
model is hierarchal, which allows analysis to start at top level, and detailed analysis for those elements 
or process steps that require further attention. 
Therefore, the main objective of the functional modelling is to identify at each level the parts where 
further analysis is required. By that the functional decomposition need to ensure that all relevant 
F0
F1 F3F2
F21 F32F31F11 F13F12
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 activities are incorporated like the various processing, storage and transport steps, the established 
safety functions, the emergency systems, the controlling software and others. If necessary the 
decomposing can be continued into very detailed items which then can be analysed through the 
application of low level hazard identification methods, as e.g. FMEA and HazOp.  
Summarizing, the analyst will go through the hydrogen supply chain looking for each level F by 
asking the question: How is the “intent” performed by what “methods” and with which “constraints”? 
Also inputs and outputs of the intent should be well identified (Ref. Figure 3 and Table 1). 
The functional model uses the SADT (Structured Analysis and Design Technique), also known as 
IDEF0 (or one of the other IDEF dialects) as included in Microsoft Visio®. The SADT uses an 
“ICOM” function block, where ICOM normally stands for Input-Control-Output-Method. In our 
hazard modelling we prefer to interpret the Control as a “Constraint” (the control function can be 
included in the Method, see Figure 9.). A typical example of a high level constraint would be: “not 
endangering human life and the environment” 
 
Figure 3 Functional modelling for hazard identification 
This function block can be interpreted as: 
Do <Objective> by <Methods> respecting <Constraints> 
Or: 
Produce <Outputs> from <Inputs> by <Methods> respecting <Constraints> 
Hierarchy is introduced by expanding each Method as a Function (a child function of the function it 
contributes to).  
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Figure 4 Example of a functional break down of the hydrogen supply and distribution chain 
Table 1 Highlight of the interrelation of some functional level. [2] 
Code Inputs Intent by Method with  Constraints Outputs 
F12 Electrical 
power 
Water 
Etc. 
Hydrogen 
production 
 Electrolyser  Max. pressure 
Availability of 
cheap power 
sources 
Hydrogen purity 
Etc. 
Hydrogen 
Oxygen 
Etc. 
F21 Hydrogen 
gas 
Engine fuel 
Etc. 
Hydrogen 
transport 
 Truck  Max. pressure 
route planning 
ADR regulation 
Etc. 
Hydrogen gas 
Engine 
pollutants 
Etc. 
F3 Hydrogen 
gas 
energy 
Etc. 
Hydrogen 
storage at 
large 
amounts 
 Cryogenic storage 
Pressurized storage 
 Max. pressure 
Temperature 
control 
Evaporation 
control 
Hydrogen gas / 
liquid 
Engine 
pollutants 
Etc. 
F4141 Data 
Power; 
Etc. 
(HRS) 
remote 
control 
signals 
 Internet/ software 
HRS safety functions 
Surveillance:  
Detection & Alarm 
DecisionAction 
Communication 
Training 
 On-line 
uninterrupted 
power supply, 
knowledge on 
specific HRS 
intercultural 
understanding 
Etc. 
Control of 
HRS 
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Figure 5. Preliminary functional model for hydrogen production  
Now hazard identification can be applied by systematically considering the consequences of 
deviations in Inputs, Constraints, Outputs and Methods. For this, traditional hazard identification 
methods can be used such as Checklists or what-if questions. In the following some potential methods 
to analyse in depth all the block of the functional breakdown are presented. 
4.0 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODS 
In the literature many other hazard identification methods are described, as e.g. PIRT, FMEA, 
HAZOP, Event Tree, Fault Tree, Safety Barrier Diagrams, DES, GIS and many other well accepted 
methods. In the following we will give examples for some of these methods and how they with benefit 
could be applicable in the framework of functional modelling. 
HAZOP 
As discussed above HazOp is a method that can be used when the functional breakdown is sufficiently 
detailed. The method is applied very successfully in process systems regarding the flow of a material 
through the system. By that the consequences caused by deviations in the systems are systematically 
recorded. The drawback is the huge demand of resources (persons, time) and the complexity of the 
outcome, which is not fulfilling the requirements behind the functional modelling philosophy. 
Nevertheless, HazOp is a top-down technique that would fit nicely to the hierarchical structure of a 
functional decomposition. The elegance of HazOp is that it allows combining the relevant 
characteristics with guidewords (such as No, More, Less, Reverse, Late, Before…) in order to generate 
possible deviations. Solving hazards can be assigned to methods in the functional model, or by 
choosing the right implementation to fulfil an intent. Therefore, with some adoptions to the HazOp 
method, it should be possible to apply the method in the context of the higher levels of functional 
modelling. The properties of the outputs, inputs, constraints and methods could be similar combined 
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 with modified guide words (e.g. guideword “no” + “method x” means method X is not performed). 
This is a novel idea of performing HAZID by means of functional modelling, which is more rigorous 
compared to Whetton’s Concept Hazard Analysis being presented in the following, which originally 
was suggested to be applied with the functional model, but does not exploit the functional 
decomposition optimally.  
CONCEPT HAZARD ANALYSIS 
As originally suggested by Wells et al [2] and adapted by Rasmussen & Whetton [1] the functional 
breakdown may be analysed for hazardous areas using the method “Concept Hazard Analysis” (CHA). 
The method may be used in early stages of planning and design of a supply chain and need only block 
diagrams or preliminary process flow diagrams as input. The method’s aim is to identify the main 
hazards. Based on the achieved functional break down of our system for each area keywords are 
applied that the group of analysts have agreed on. The keywords are addressing generic issues, as 
shown in Table 2. Therefore, the team performing CHA has to adopt a set of relevant specific 
keywords for the given analysis. 
Table 2 List of generic keywords used in “Concept Hazard Analysis” as suggested by [2] 
Flammables Ignition 
Fire 
Explosion / detonation 
Mechanical 
hazards 
Structural hazards 
Collapse, drop 
Chemicals Toxicity 
Corrosion 
Off-specification 
Mode of 
operation
  
Start-up / Shutdown 
Maintenance 
Abnormal 
Emergency 
Pollutants Emissions 
Effluents 
Ventilation 
Release of 
material 
Release on rupture 
Release by discharge 
Fugitive emissions 
Periodic emissions 
Handling / Entry 
Health hazards Chemical contact 
Noise 
Illumination 
Loss of 
services 
Electricity 
Water 
Other services 
Electrical/radiat
ion hazards 
Electrical 
Radiation 
Laser 
External 
threats 
Accidental impact; Drop/fall; Act of God 
Extreme weather 
External interferences 
Loosening / Vibration 
Sabotage / Theft 
External energetic event 
External toxic event 
External contamination 
Corrosion /erosion 
Thermodynamic 
hazards 
Over- / under pressure 
over- / under-temperature 
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 Table 3 Analysis of the found intents (I), methods (M) and constraints (C) using selected keywords 
from CHA 
Function Concept Hazard Analysis 
Ref T Description Keyword Main variance Consequences Mitigation Notes 
F12 M Water 
electrolysis 
Chemicals: 
Corrosion 
Release  
Fire 
Heat radiation on 
equipment 
ATEX  
F21 M Truck 
transport 
(pressurized) 
Thermodynamic 
hazards: over 
temperature 
Weakening of 
truck tank 
walls under 
filling 
Tank rupture Slow filling, 
pre-cooling 
Depends on 
storage type 
F3 I Hydrogen 
storage 
External: 
Accidental impact 
due to obstacle 
collision 
Structural 
damage: 
leakage 
insulation 
Release of 
hydrogen / 
overpressure in 
cryogenic system 
Fences 
authorization to 
enter 
 
F4141 C On-line with 
data 
connection 
Mode of operation: 
Abnormal 
Off-line  
Loss of 
control of 
HRS 
Possible 
escalation of 
minor events 
High SIL level  
local operation  
HRS shuts 
automatically 
down on loss 
of data 
connection 
 
Application of geographical information systems GIS 
An important issue, when analyzing hydrogen supply and distribution networks, is the knowledge 
about the specific geographical positions of the hazardous areas to evaluate for social risk criteria. This 
is closely related to decisions on additional preventive and mitigating measures to ensure the 
acceptance criteria of a given installation. It is important to know about the population density, the 
environmental vulnerability and the location of hospitals, emergency service etc. along the networks. 
For this GIS is a very efficient and valuable tool (see e.g. [3] as it allows to superimpose thematic 
maps and to analyse for e.g. the population density for any geographical position). It is straight 
forward to model the hydrogen supply and distribution networks with a GIS environment using 
established geographical maps and CAD drawings from the planning state of the networks. As the 
functional model regards the intents as objects, it is possible to attach graphical object(s) with an intent 
and by that preserve the geographical position together with the attributes listed in the table form of 
the results of the functional model and the results of hazard identification tables.  
For a quantitative risk assessment data on the system state (amounts, pressures, temperature, etc.) 
could as well be attached to the graphical objects supporting consequence assessments, while 
necessary weather, population densities and other data could be provided by respective thematic maps. 
Life cycle assessment and Life cycle costing 
Establishing sustainable hydrogen supply and distribution networks it is not sufficient only to evaluate 
the safety aspects that provide the social acceptance of the emerging technology. Decision support has 
also to be provided concerning the environmental aspects and the economic aspects of sustainability 
using the methods of Life cycle assessment (LCA) and Life cycle costing (LCC). The LCA method 
has been standardized by ISO standards [4]. The steps to perform the assessment is starting with a goal 
and scope definition and is defining the fuel unit (called functional unit) that is followed through the 
different stages of the life cycle of the fuel, as shown in Figure 7. This could here be defined as e.g. a 
unit of 5kg hydrogen (i.a. a tank fill). The second step is to establish a comprehensive inventory for all 
the materials going into and out of the stages and energies used. This is then followed by an impact 
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 assessment to predict environmental and human effects of the effluents and the resources used. For 
each step an interpretation of the results is done.  
 
Figure 6 Steps in Life cycle assessment according to ISO standard [4] 
Similar the LCC method [5]is regarding the cost flow of the stages and is directly following the same 
model as the LCA. This makes the results excellent comparable. It is also seen the similarity between 
the functional modelling and the LCA/LCC approach, as the functional block is also looking for the 
inputs and outputs and the functions on level F1 to F4 are directly comparable to the stages 1 to 4 of 
the LCA/LCC. Therefore, the functional model output tables may be widened to include the essential 
approbriate aggregated data of the Life cycle inventory. 
 
Figure 7 Stages of a LCA/LCC assessment for a fuelling system 
5.0 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The risk assessment of a complete supply chain is analyzed using the functional modelling approach 
and the conceptual hazard analysis methodology. The high level risk analysis enables the efficient risk 
assessment and help to restrict the assessment to the hazardous parts of concern. The functional 
modelling allows the modelling of new designed technologies and may be more and more detailed as 
new information and alternative technologies are implemented. At a certain level there is a transition 
where a low level assessment is appropriate, which is easily handled by the approach and the 
application of FMEA and HazOp is also supported. 
The results of the functional break down may be presenetd as tables or as a functional graph. The latter 
may be also implemented as a GIS database, where the geographical information is preserved along 
with the detailed technical information necessary. Using GIS the analysis can be easily extended using 
thematical maps and by that the identification of vulernable objects is facilitated. This enables a 
generic risk assessment as modules of hydrogen components that easily are placed in the specific 
environment that in the end has to be assessed. 
For a holistic decision support other sustainability aspects as the environment and the economical ones 
are needed and they should be based on the same detailed model to ensure consistent modelling of 
systems. It is shown that the basic model used for the functional breakdown can be similar to the 
stages of the LCA/LCC and by that the functional model database may be used as the comprehensive 
database to collect relevant input, output, methods, constraints, graphical data and inventory data to 
ensure a single place storage and maintenance of the needed data and assumptions. 
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